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Abstract. Using an additional zero-knowledge proof we improve the
verifiability guarantees for the JCJ e-voting protocol [4], meaning that
neither the Registration nor the Tally Tellers can collude to break veri-
fiability.
1 Introduction
In their seminal paper Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [4] investigated pos-
sible coercion attacks in e-voting and suggested a coercion-resistant protocol.
This protocol was later implemented as Civitas [3] with several specifications,
in particular for the registration procedure. Many papers have investigated the
security properties of this protocol and several modifications and alternatives
have been suggested, see e.g. [5] for an overview. The scheme is in its core quite
simple: The voters have secret credentials provided to them by a set of Registra-
tion Tellers. When casting a ballot, the voter append her encrypted credential.
A coerced voter can simply provide the coercer with a fake credential. Ballots
containing invalid credentials are discarded in the tally by the use of plaintext
equivalence tests done by a (threshold) set of Tally Tellers.
One problem of JCJ/Civitas is that it has verifiability trust in the Registra-
tion and Tally Tellers. If all the Registration Tellers collude, or a threshold set
of the Tally Tellers, they know the credentials being used by the voters and can
cast valid ballots on behalf of any voter. Depending on the verifiability defini-
tion, JCJ thus does not satisfy eligibility verifiability, see e.g. [8]. In JCJ this is
especially troublesome since the adversary can also use this to change the votes
of honest voters, e.g. if the update policy is last vote counts, the adversary will
cast his choice as late as possible overruling the already cast honest vote.1 This
does not invalidate the security promises of Civitas which assumes no such col-
lusion of Tellers. However this could, arguably should, be worrisome to a voter,
1 This might be detected by an alert voter since JCJ/Civitas chooses to perform the
weeding of votes before mixing (which in turn might be troublesome in dynamic
coercion scenarios). In general, the percentage of voters actually doing such secu-
rity checks are generally low, and even if a voter reports such an event it would be
disputable since the voter could have cast the extra votes herself. A robust blaming
seems to endanger coercion-resistance and is necessary in order to avoid voters ma-
liciously denouncing a valid election after the tally has been announced. Thus it is
better to prevent this situation from happening at all.
who does not know if the election has been manipulated by colluding Tellers or
perhaps a hacker capable of attacking a few central security points.
In this note we remove the verifiability trust in the Tellers, completely within
the setup of JCJ/Civitas, and with the mild price of a longer zero-knowledge
proof for the vote casting part and a simple change in the registration procedure.
The idea is very simple, Civitas assumes (as also suggested in JCJ) that each
voter has a designated verifier key. We let the credential depend on this key such
that only the voter knows the discrete logarithm of the credential. Ballots are
then cast with a proof of knowledge of this discrete logarithm. Now, even if the
Tellers collude, they can get to know the credentials, but under assumption of
hardness of the discrete logarithm problem they cannot use this to cast a valid
vote. To our knowledge this idea has not been reported earlier.
2 Protocol Structure
To keep this note short we will assume that the reader is familiar with Civitas
[3] and only display the differences. The main participants are the voters, Vi, the
Registration Tellers, RTj , and the Tally Tellers, TTk. The cryptography is based
on a DDH secure group of prime order q and generator g. Let enc(v;KTT) denote
ElGamal encryption in this group and KTT be the (threshold) public key of the
Tally Tellers. We also assume that the voters are provided with an infrastructure
of designated verifier keys dvki = g
xi .
2.1 Registration
The registration is quite similar to Civitas. For each eligible voter Vi, each
Registration Teller RTj picks randomly cij ∈ Zq and publishes enc(gcij ;KTT)
on the Bulletin Board in a row marked for voter Vi. From RTj voter Vi gets
cij and a zero-knowledge proof designated to dvki of correct encryption of g
cij .
For each voter the ciphertexts of the credential shares are multiplied together
and further multiplied with enc(dvki;KTT) encrypted with trivial randomness.
By the homomorphic property of ElGamal this gives an encryption of the voter
credential Ci = g
ci := g
∑
j cij+xi . The difference to Civitas is that the voter gets
cij instead of g
cij and the extra multiplication with dvki (or some public key of
the voter).2
2 We have here followed Civitas closely, but we could also construct the keys gxi during
the registration interactively. The important part is that the registration authorities
do not know xi and the voter does, as in a designated verifier key infrastructure.
One can also use erasure of data at the end of registration as is suggested in JCJ
as an alternative to designated verifier proofs. In both cases an interactive proof of
knowledge of xi should be given during registration where we anyway assume no
coercion (another possibility is to keep the term gxi under encryption and split for
each Teller and the proofs changed accordingly). This is in order to stop a coercer
from determining gxi before registration without divulging the secret key xi to the
voter, which in turn could create receipts and also allow forced abstention attacks.
If the voter is coerced, she chooses at random an alternative value c′i ∈ Zq
and shows gc
′
i as her credential to the coercer. The proofs can be faked with her
secret designated verifier key and this key could even be revealed to the coercer,
at least after registration.
2.2 Vote Casting
Like in JCJ/Civitas a ballot is cast via an anonymous channel to the Bulletin
Board. Given a credential C and a vote choice v, the ballot has the form
( enc(C;KTT), enc(v;KTT), pi1, pi2, pi3 ) .
Here pi1, pi2, pi3 are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKPs). Just like in
Civitas, pi1 is a proof that the ciphertext for the vote is well-formed, and pi2 is a
proof that C and v are simultaneously known which is done by demonstrating
knowledge of the random coins used in the encryptions. This proof prevents the
ballot from being malleable. The proof pi3 is our novel part and is a proof of
knowledge of the discrete logarithm of the encrypted credential. To specify the
proof let enc(C;KTT) := (a, b). The proof is now done by choosing a random s
and publishing
as, bs, Cs,DLK(as, a),DLE(as, a, bs, b),DLK(Cs, g),DLE(as, g, bs/Cs,KTT)
where DLK(a, g) is a NIZKP of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of a relative
to g and DLE(a, g, b, g′) is a NIZKP of equality of the discrete logarithm of a and
b with respect to generators g and g′. These are efficiently implemented by using
the Fiat-Shamir transformation on Schnorr [7] and Chaum-Pedersen proofs [2].
The first part of pi3 shows that we lift a, b to the same known power and then
we show that Cs is the plaintext of this encryption, and finally that we know its
discrete logarithm. Since s is known, this shows that we know logg C. This gives
soundness. Zero-knowledge follows from the employed NIZKPs and DDH for the
extra elements, given that the adversary does not know the randomness in the
encryption and the secret key of KTT, in which case he would anyway know C.
Full proofs are postponed for a long version of this note.
To avoid having malleability in the proofs we include both encryptions in the
hashes of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, see also [1]. If this is also done for pi1, we
can drop the proof pi2 and in this case the extra overhead compared to Civitas
is just 3 hashes and 7 exponentiations.
Finally, the tally can be done like in JCJ/Civitas.
3 Security & Comments
We see that it is no longer possible to cast valid ballots unless you know the
discrete logarithm of the credential. The Registration Tellers do not know this
even if they are all colluding, unless they somehow know the secret key of dvki,
in which case they anyway could attack verifiability during registration. The
Tally Tellers, if colluding, could decrypt the credentials, but do not know the
discrete logarithms. Such misbehavior can now give rise to privacy or possibly
coercion attacks, but no longer endangers verifiability. We emphasize that this
scheme does not improve on coercion-resistance, but only the verifiability guar-
antees, and it has the same assumptions as JCJ/Civitas for coercion-resistance.
In JCJ this is done by assuming that the registration phase proceeds without
any corruption, and will also require that the two set of tellers are not colluding,
see further [4].
Note that more user-friendly versions of the protocol e.g. using hardware with
pin-codes [6,5] are still possible if adapted. In the future it would be important
to examine the security of the protocol in detail, cast the cryptography in the
setting of bilinear maps to remove the random oracle assumption, and further
develop the protocol e.g. using secret registration (towards the Tellers) for better
and everlasting privacy.
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